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•JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from portions of the final Judgment of the
Seventh Judicial District Court following the trial of all issues
to the Court.
1987.

Judgment was entered on the 29th day of October,

Notice of Appeal was filed with the Clerk of the Seventh

Judicial District Court on the 27th day of November, 1987.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal
from the final Order of the Seventh Judicial District Court
pursuant

to

§78-2-2 (3) (i) ,

Utah

Code

Annotated

(1953),

as

amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Lower Court err in ruling that the Respondent

was not estopped from placing the right-of-way of Cedar Hills
Drive ten feet (10') to twelve feet (12') from the foundation of
Appellants'

home

despite

Respondent's

earlier

representations

that the right-of-way was thirty-one feet (31') to thirty-five
feet (35') away from Appellants1 home?
2.

Did the Trial Court err in finding that the Appellants

had trespassed upon the right-of-way of the Respondent and in
assessing damages therefor?
3.

Did the Trial Court err in failing to terminate the

easement of the City along 300 North Street for purposes of
maintenance?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs are the owners of a residence, dental office and
other real property situated within the City limits of the City
of Price and located generally in the area of two City streets
known as 300 North Street and Cedar Hills Drive.

This appeal

deals with claims made against the City by reason of the alignment and construction of the above-named City streets.
The original Complaint
relief

in three

of

(3) separate

the Plaintiffs
areas, generally

(R. 1) sought
identified

as

follows:
A.

First Claim for Relief.

Estoppel against the

City with regards to the location of the right-of-way
of Cedar Hills Drive as it adjoins the residence and
dental office property of the Plaintiffs.
B.

Second Claim for Relief.

(R. 8).

The right of the

City to appeal a Board of Adjustment decision granting
to Plaintiffs a variance as to the heighth of a fence
to be constructed on their property.
C.

Third Claim for Relief.

Termination of an

easement held by the City along the northern boundary
of Plaintiffs1 property as it adjoins 300 North Street.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the City as to the First
and Third Claims for Relief.

The Trial Court also ruled in favor

of the City as to a portion of its Counterclaim for damages for
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trespass•

It is from these rulings only that Plaintiffs bring

this Appeal,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Plaintiffs purchased their property, consisting of a

27-acre parcel in 1977.

At the time of the purchase the City

Street known as Cedar Hills Drive traversed a portion of Plaintiffs1 property and was improved with a hard asphalt surface.
(Tr. 9-11.)

However, the City street now known as 300 North did

not exist and had not been constructed.
2.

At the time of their purchase, Plaintiffs intended to

build a home and dental office on a portion of the property.

In

order to do so, Plaintiffs inquired of various City personnel as
to the procedure to be followed in obtaining a building permit
for such construction.

(Tr. 14.)

Plaintiffs made these in-

quiries of Mr. Lynn Ockey who was, at that time, the City Building Inspector and of Mr. John Huefner, who was the City Engineer.
(Tr. 13-14.)
3.

In response to the inquiries of Plaintiffs, Mr. Huefner

represented that in order to obtain a building permit, Plaintiffs
would have to designate an area of the property as their building
lot.

Mr. Huefner

further informed

the Plaintiffs that since

Cedar Hills Drive was a limited access road, Plaintiffs' home and
dental office would need to face, and have access to and from, a
street other than Cedar Hills Drive.
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Plaintiffs were advised

that it would be necessary to construct a city street which
connected to Cedar Hills Drive for the purpose of gaining access
to the home and dental office.
4.

Ultimately,

Mr.

(Tr. 14.)

Huefner

suggested

that

Plaintiffs

construct their home and dental office in the northeast quadrant
of their property at the intersection of what is now 30 0 North
Street and Cedar Hills Drive.

In conjunction with that desig-

nation, Plaintiffs were advised by Mr. Huefner that, as a condition to obtaining a building permit, Plaintiffs would be required
to dedicate a portion of their property along their northern
boundary to the City for the purpose of constructing 300 North
Street.
5.

(Tr. 16.)
After Plaintiffs agreed to the placement of their home

and dental office in the area described above, Mr. Huefner, the
City Engineer, prepared written legal descriptions of both the
building lot where Plaintiffs' home would be constructed as well
as a parcel of property approximately one hundred seventy feet
(170') by thirty feet (30') which was to be dedicated to the City
for the sole purpose of constructing 300 North Street.

(Tr. 18;

Exh. 2.)
6.

Plaintiffs were then told by Mr. Huefner that in order

to get a building permit they would need to produce a "plot plan"
or a drawing showing the location of the improvements in relation
to the City streets of Cedar Hills Drive and 300 North.
conjunction

with

this

information, Mr.

-4-

Huefner

informed

In
the

Plaintiffs that the required setback from Cedar Hills Drive and
from 300 North was thirty feet (30').

Plaintiffs decided that in

order to be in compliance with the setback requirements, they
would place their home and dental office thirty-five feet (351)
from Cedar Hills and fifty feet

(50f) from 300 North Street.

(Tr. 21-27; Exh. 3.)
7.

At the time Mr. Huefner, as the City Engineer, discussed

with Plaintiffs the setback requirements and the requirements of
the plot plan, Mr. Huefner indicated

to Plaintiffs that the

dedicated right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive was sixty-six feet
(661) wide.
prepared

This measurement was placed on a draft plot plan

by Mr. Huefner.

(Tr. 27.)

In fact, the dedicated

right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive was eighty feet

(80') wide.

Plaintiffs were advised to rely upon the sixty-six foot
measurement by Mr. Huefner.
8.

After

Plaintiffs

(66f)

(Tr. 28.)
received

a

building

permit,

they

retained an excavator for the purpose of digging the basement and
foundation for the home and dental office.

However, before such

excavation could commence, Plaintiffs were advised that it would
be necessary for the City Engineer to place wooden markers on the
property showing the required setback from both 300 North and
Cedar Hills Drive.

This would ensure that the building, once

constructed, did not violate the setback requirements.
9.

At the request of Plaintiffs, the City Engineer, John

Huefner, placed

stakes

on

the property
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showing

the required

setback at thirty feet (30') from the right-of-way line of Cedar
Hills Drive and 300 North,

(Tr. 326-28.)

Mr. Huefner stated

that he measured the thirty foot (30') distance on Cedar Hills
Drive from the eighty foot (80') right-of-way line as opposed to
the sixty-six foot (66') right-of-way line.
10.

(Tr. 330.)

In reliance upon the stakes places on the property by

the City Engineer, Plaintiffs caused their residence and real
property to be constructed, placing the building at a distance of
approximately thirty-five feet (35') from the right-of-way line
of Cedar Hills Drive and well beyond the setback line marked by
Mr. Huefner.

Plaintiffs thereafter believed that their property

was beyond thirty feet (30') from the right-of-way line of Cedar
Hills Drive.
11.

(Tr. 63.)

After the home and dental office were substantially

constructed, Plaintiffs and the City became involved in a dispute
regarding the construction and elevation of 3 00 North Street.
Because of the elevation at which 300 North Street was constructed, Plaintiffs were denied access to their garage.

As a part of

the resolution of that dispute, the City agreed to allow Plaintiffs to construct a garage which would have direct access to
Cedar Hills Drive.

The Plaintiffs constructed the garage facili-

ty, but did not immediately construct the driveway which would
connect directly onto Cedar Hills Drive.
12.

Further

dispute, the City

in conjunction
returned

with

(Tr. 69.)
the

to Plaintiffs

-6-

settlement
the property

of the
which

Plaintiffs had originally dedicated to the City for the purpose
of constructing 300 North Street.

This was done for the reason

that the City had discovered that the asphalt surface of 300
North had not been constructed
Plaintiffs, but

had

been

upon the parcel dedicated by

constructed

totally

upon

property which had been dedicated for the same purpose.

adjoining
However,

the parties agreed that because there was a substantial slope
from the road surface to the edge of the road, the City should be
granted an easement over the property returned to Plaintiffs, for
the purpose of maintaining that slope.
13.

(Tr. 47.)

At the time of the resolution of this dispute, the

parties understood that the Plaintiffs intended, at some point in
time, to fill in the area between their home and the surface of
the road, thereby obviating the need for the maintenance easement.

Subsequently, in connection with Plaintiffs1 construction

of a patient parking area and driveway off 300 North, Plaintiffs
did, in fact, fill in the sloped area.
14.

In the Summer of 1983 the Plaintiffs desired to con-

struct the driveway from their new garage to Cedar Hills Drive
and to place a fence along their property line as it adjoined
Cedar Hills Drive and 300 North Streets.

Plaintiffs were advised

by various employees of the City that because the fence was more
than four feet (41) in height, it would require a variance from
the Board of Adjustment.

Plaintiffs made appropriate application

to the Board of Adjustment for a variance to build a six foot
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(61) fence and were granted their application.

However, before

the fence could be constructed, the City, by and through the City
Administrator, objected to the granted variance and brought the
matter on for hearing before the City Council.
15.

At a meeting of the City Council held on September 28,

1983, the City objected to the grant of variance for a six foot
(61) fence.

(Tr. 113.)

A subsequent meeting of the City Council

was held on October 12, 1983 to consider the objection of the
City.

At this subsequent meeting, the City Council directed the

City Engineer, Mr. Gary Sonntag, to go to Plaintiffs' property
and stake the right-of-way line so that the City Council could
understand the proximity of the proposed fence to the right-ofway and to Plaintiffs1 home and property.
16.

(R. 117.)

Pursuant to the instructions of the City Council, the

City Engineer was on the property of the Plaintiffs on October
13, 1983.

At that time the City Engineer reported to the Plain-

tiffs that he had calculated the distance between the right-ofway line of Cedar Hills Drive and Plaintiffs' home to be thirtyone feet (31') as opposed to the thirty-five feet (35') which had
earlier been represented.
17.

(Tr. 117-18.)

Based upon the measurements which were given to the

Plaintiffs by the City Engineer, a drawing of the Plaintiffs1
property showing the location of the residence, the location of
the right-of-way and the position of the proposed
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fence, was

prepared by Plaintiffs and distributed to the members of the City
Council.

(Tr. 119.)

18.

At the time the City Engineer calculated the distance

from the Cedar Hills Drive
commenced

right-of-way, Plaintiffs

the construction of the proposed

had

not

fence and had not

commenced the construction of the driveway which would connect
their new garage to Cedar Hills Drive.
19.

(Tr. 118-20.)

On the Monday following the visit of the City Engineer

to Plaintiffs1 property, the entire City Council, together with
other key employees, visited the property in order to physically
view the wooden stakes which the City Engineer had placed on the
property showing the location of the right-of-way of Cedar Hills
Drive.

At that time the City Engineer confirmed to the City

Council that the distance between the right-of-way and Plaintiffs' property was thirty-one feet (31f).
upon

their view of

(Tr. 121-22.)

the property, the City

Based

Council approved

Plaintiffs' construction of a fence along the right-of-way line
which had been designated

by the City Engineer.

(Tr. 123.)

Written confirmation of this approval, together with a written
plan showing the distance between the right-of-way and the house
to be thirty-one feet
Plaintiffs.
20.

(31'), was sent by the City Engineer to

(Exh. 18.)

Only after the distance between Plaintiffs' residence

and the right-of-way was confirmed and established by the City
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Engineer did the Plaintiffs begin construction of the fence and
the driveway,
21.

Plaintiffs immediately commenced the construction of

the driveway.

The driveway

approximately twelve inches

consisted

of reinforced

concrete

(12") in thickness which extended

thirty feet (30') from the foundation of the garage to a point
one foot (1') short of the right-of-way line established by the
City.

The driveway was sufficiently wide to accommodate the

multiple

car

garage

of

the

Plaintiffs,

(Tr.

125-28.)

The

construction of the driveway was inspected periodically by the
Price City Building Inspector, Mr. Taylor, and by the Price City
Engineer, Mr. Sonntag.

(Tr. 126.)

was finished on November 5, 1983.
22.

On

September

22nd,

Construction of the driveway
(Tr. 129.)

1984

Plaintiffs

commenced

struction of the fence which had been approved by the City.

conThe

initial work done consisted of excavation for the footings and
foundation of the fence columns.
23.

However, before

(Tr. 129-130.)

further work could be done on the

fence, Plaintiffs received notice from the City that the work
which had been done on the driveway and which was being done on
the fence was within the right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive.

The

City notified Plaintiffs, for the first time, that a new survey
had been completed and that the right-of-way line of Cedar Hills
Drive was not thirty-one feet (31') from Plaintiffs' home, but
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was now approximately ten feet (10') from Plaintiffs' home.

(Tr.

131; Exh. 19.)
24.

In accordance with this new information which the City

claimed to have, it issued a stop work order against the Plaintiffs, resulting in the filing of this litigation.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The arguments of Plaintiffs are simple and straight forward.
First,

Plaintiffs

believe

that

the

City,

by

virtue

of

a

long-standing pattern of conduct on the part of authorized City
employees, is estopped to claim that the right-of-way of Cedar
Hills Drive is closer than thirty-one feet (31f) from the foundation of Plaintiffs1 home.

The corresponding argument is that,

since Defendant is estopped, Plaintiff has not trespassed upon
the right-of-way belonging to the City.

Accordingly, the Trial

Court erred in ruling that the Defendant was entitled to any
damages by reason of said alleged trespass.

It is, in fact,

solely by reason of the estoppel of the Defendant that Plaintiffs
find themselves having placed their improvements within the said
right-of-way.
Plaintiffs further assert that when the property along 300
North Street was reconveyed to Plaintiffs by the City, the only
purpose for which the City retained a fourteen foot (14') easement was to allow the City to maintain a severe slope which
existed from the shoulder of 300 North Street down to Plaintiffs1
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property.

Accordingly, the Trial Court erred in failing to rule

that the easement should be terminated given the fact that the
slope was filled in by Plaintiffs and no longer needed maintenance by the City.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BARS THE CITY FROM CLAIMING
THE RIGHT-OF-WAY OF CEDAR HILLS DRIVE TO BE CLOSER THAN
THIRTY-ONE FEET FROM PLAINTIFFS' HOME.
The main claim made by Plaintiffs is that the conduct,
agreements and representations of the City as to the location of
Cedar Hills Drive prohibits the City from enforcing a right-ofway which is closer than thirty-one feet (31') from Plaintiffs1
home.

There can be no dispute that on a number of occasions the

City made specific representations as to the location of the
right-of-way and that the Plaintiffs acted in direct reliance
upon those representations.
The doctrine of equitable estoppel has increasingly been
held to apply against governmental entities, including municipalities.

In 1982 this Court recognized that there exists a valid

exception to the general rule that equitable estoppel will not
apply to the government.
In Utah State University. Etc. v. Sutro & Co., et. al», 646
P.2d 715 (Utah 1982) the Supreme Court was dealing with a claim
by stockbrokers that officials of the University had represented
they had authority to trade in common stocks and that the brokers
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had relied on those representations.

In remanding the matter to

the

held

District

well-recognized

Court,

this

exception

Court

under

shielded from a claim of estoppel.

which

the

that

there

government

is

a

is not

The Court stated:

We have no doubt about the soundness nor the
salutary purpose of the rule that estoppel generally is
not assertable against the government or governmental
institutions. . . . Notwithstanding our approval of
that rule, like most general rules, there are exceptions when its rigid application would defeat,
rather than serve, the higher purpose that all rules
are intended to serve: that of doing justice• . . .
When it is plainly apparent that its application would
result in injustice, and there would be no substantial
adverse affect on public policy, the Courts will honor
the higher purpose of doing justice by invoking the
exception, rather than departing from that desired
objective in slavish adherence to a general rule. Id.
at 718.
This Court, in Utah State University, then noted a United
States Federal Court case in which the exception has been applied.

At page 719 the Justice Crockett observed:

Another case which we regard as helpful and
representing sound reasoning on this subject is that of
United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, [481 F. 2d 985 (1973)].
After reviewing the case law the Court stated that
estoppel should be allowed as a defense against the
government where to do otherwise would work a serious
injustice, and the public interest would not be unduly
damaged by the interposition of that defense. In its
discussion, the Court engaged in what has been referred
to as a "balancing of equities" test and concluded that
under the facts of that case a grave injustice would
result if the government were not held responsible for
the information it had given the Ranch and which the
latter had relied on . . . .
Other cases highlight the circumstances under which estoppel
may be applied against the government.
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In Celebrity Club, Inc.

v, Utah Liquor Control Commission/ 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) this
Court stated that the government was estopped to deny a license
to a club within 600 feet of a school where the Commission had
represented that the location was in compliance on more than one
occasion

and

the owners

had

incurred

substantial

expense in

reliance upon the Commission.
Furthermore/ in Town of Boulder v. Bullock/ 632 P. 2d 716
(Mont*

1981)

the

owner

of

property,

after

obtaining

proper

permits from the City, constructed a home and office building
which encroached upon a City right-of-way.

The Montana Supreme

Court applied the exception and barred the City from enjoining
the encroachment.
The case at hand falls squarely within the body of caselaw
represented by the above citations.
estopped, Plaintiffs must

only

For the City to be equitably

show that

the

application

of

estoppel is 1) supported by representations reasonably relied
upon; 2) without the estoppel substantial injustice would result;
and 3) the granting of estoppel would not adversely affect public
policy.

Under the undisputed facts presented to the Trial Court/

the Plaintiffs more than meet these requirements.
The number of times, as shown by the evidence/ that Plaintiffs were misled by officials of the Cityf
official capacities/ is most disturbing.

acting in their

The Plaintiffs have

been the unknowing victims of numerous representations by the
City as to the distance between their home and Cedar Hills Drive.
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The representation of thirty feet (30') was made when the
City

Engineer

first

marked

the

setback

constructions of Plaintiffs' foundation.

requirement

for

the

It is undisputed that

Plaintiffs built their home beyond the stakes set by the City
Engineer,

and

thereafter

believed

that

thirty-five feet (35') from the right-of-way.

their

house

was

Again, in 1983,

the City specifically, and with specific intent, represented to
Plaintiffs that the right-of-way of Cedar Hills Drive was some
thirty-one feet (31') from their home.

Only after the City had

located the right-of-way line, and only after the City, by and
through the City Council had given specific approval to that
line, did Plaintiffs commence significant improvements to their
property.

Before the City stopped the work, Plaintiffs, with the

full knowledge and approval of the City, had constructed a large
concrete driveway which extended from their new garage out to the
right-of-way line which had been represented by the City.

In

addition, Plaintiffs purchased the materials for and commenced
the construction of their fence, again at the right-of-way line
indicated by the City.
There is no dispute that Plaintiffs had nothing to do with
the establishment of the thirty-one foot (31') measurement.

The

testimony was clear that Plaintiffs only knew of that particular
distance

when

told

them

by

the

City

Engineer.

Until

Plaintiffs thought the distance to be thirty-five feet (351).
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then

The Trial Court simply erred in not finding that Plaintiffs
had relied to their detriment upon the representations of the
City.

The reliance is obvious, open and direct.

in the

form of

substantial

expenditures

likewise, open, obvious and direct.
appalling

when

one

considers

the

in

The detriment,

improvements is,

The detriment is even more
fact

that

the Trial Court

entered judgment against the Plaintiffs for the supposed cost of
removing those very improvements which the Plaintiffs had placed
on the property after the City told them where the right-of-way
line was.
POINT II.
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS FOR TRESPASS
IS CLEARLY INAPPROPRIATE.
Admittedly, the ruling of the Court granting the City a
judgment for the supposed trespass of the Plaintiffs is a natural
outgrowth of the finding that the City was not estopped.

In

other words, the Trial Court would naturally conclude that the
City was entitled to the cost of removing improvements placed in
the right-of-way area by the Plaintiffs if it concluded that the
Plaintiffs were not entitled to those improvements.

By the same

token, the argument that the Trial Court erred in entering such
judgment

is

a

natural

outgrowth

of

a

ruling

in

favor

of

Plaintiffs.
The ruling of the Court was simply that since the City was
not estopped to claim that the right-of-way was a bare ten feet
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(10') from Plaintiffs' home, the City was, therefore, entitled to
the cost of removing those improvements which had been placed in
the area belonging to the City.

Strangely, the fact that the

City would be entitled to such a judgment if the City was not
estopped, is further evidence that estoppel must apply.

It is

nothing short of ludicrous to argue that the City can allow, if
not instruct, a landowner to place improvements on property and
then to obtain a judgment against the landowner when the City
determines that the improvements have been placed, mistakenly, on
its property.
POINT III.
THE RESERVATION OF AN EASEMENT SHOULD TERMINATE.
The last issue raised by Plaintiffs relates to the reservation by the City of a fourteen foot

(14') easement over the

property of Plaintiffs as it abuts 300 North Street.
contend

Plaintiffs

that at the time of the reservation there existed a

substantial slope on 300 North down into the property of Plaintiffs.

Thus, there was a single and salutary purpose for the

easement, to wit:
slope.

the need

for constant maintenance of the

However, when the slope was filled in by the Plaintiffs

with the consent of the City, the need for a fourteen foot (14f)
easement disappeared.

Since it was the clear intention of the

parties to solve a maintenance problem, the property of the
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Plaintiffs

should

no

longer

be

encumbered

by

such

a

large

easement.
The law with respect to reformation of a deed is clear.
Haslam

v.

Ottosen,

689

P.2d

27

(Utah

1984)

this

In

Court, in

allowing the reformation of a Warranty Deed, cited with approval,
the following language from §619 of Corbin On Contracts:
If two parties are in clear agreement as to the
factual and legal result that they wish to accomplish,
and a deed or other document is drawn by a scrivener
using words that do not produce that result, the case
is a proper one for reformation of the instrument . . .
it makes no difference whether this is called a mistake
of fact or a mistake of law or a mistake of both
together. With respect to the legal effect of the
words, the two parties no doubt make the same mistake
that the scrivener made; and they make it because they
relied on him. Ld. at 30.
See also, Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520 (Utah 1980); Bound v.
Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984); Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d
1271 (Utah 1984) .
The facts presented to the Trial Court indicate that the
only intention of the parties when the reservation of easement
was made was to allow the City a method by which it could maintain the property.

The City did not argue, at Trial, that it had

another purpose for reserving to itself an easement of fourteen
feet (14f) in front of the home of the Plaintiffs.

Indeed, no

expert testimony was introduced to show that the City had any
legitimate need

for fourteen

feet

filled in.
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(14f) after the slope was

The mutual mistake of the parties was their failure to place
language which would limit the use of the easement to maintenance
of the slope.

Such mistake is the proper subject of reformation.

Accordingly/ the Trial Court erred in failing to rule that since
the intention of the parties was to maintain a slope which no
longer

existed/

the

need

for

the

easement

likewise

should

terminate.
CONCLUSION
A more appropriate circumstance for the imposition of the
doctrine of estoppel is hard to imagine.

Plaintiffs have done

nothing more than to rely upon the specific and

intentional

representations of the municipality of which they are residents.
This is not a case where Plaintiffs could or should have done
something more to protect themselves.

The City went to great

lengths to tell Plaintiffs where the right-of-way line was. When
those representations were made by the City, it knew, through its
agents including the City Council, that Plaintiffs intended to
undertake specific and costly improvements to their property as a
result of the representations made.
The injustice caused by this whole scenario is shocking.
Plaintiffs built their home believing that it was a comfortable
distance from the street/ only to find out/ years later, that the
City Engineer was wrong and that a major City thoroughfare was
barely ten feet (10f) from their door.
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Later, Plaintiffs were specifically told by the City Engineer, in a meeting with the City Council on the property, which
was convened for that very purpose, that the right-of-way line
was thirty-one feet (31') from their home.

The City, again, knew

that Plaintiffs intended to undertake substantial and expensive
improvements

to their property.

Plaintiffs

spent

substantial

sums on a cement driveway and approach to Cedar Hills Drive, as
well as the commencement of fence construction, only to be told
by the Trial Court that, for their trouble, Plaintiffs would have
to pay the City to remove those very improvements which were
placed on the property with the City's knowledge.

Once more, the

City had to admit that it had made a terrible mistake, but one
which it declined to do anything about.
In similar fashion, the City agreed to give back to Plaintiffs that very property which Plaintiffs had been required to
give to the City originally for the building of 300 North Street.
The City had simply failed to build the road on the property
which it required Terry's to give.

In that transaction the City

required Plaintiffs to encumber their property with a fourteen
foot

(14')

easement

for

unusually steep slope.

the

purposes

of

maintenance

of

an

Plaintiffs were only too happy to give

that easement because of the slope.

However, all parties under-

stood that absent such a slope, no such encumbrance would be
necessary.

Nevertheless,

the

City

refuses

to

easement which is clearly excessive and unnecessary.
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terminate

an

A

patent

injustice

has

occurred.

Plaintiffs

met

their

burden before the Trial Court; yet the injustice continues.
is

respectfully

submitted

that

the

law

of

estoppel

It

clearly

applies, that the Trial Court erred in holding otherwise and that
the judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed.
Dated this 5th day of December, 1988.
POOLE & SMITH

DUANET*. SMITH
Attorneys for Appellants

TERRYAPPEALBRF/
PLEAD9
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